Family types and the spirit of capitalism: Evidence from regional surveys

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Abstract:

Recently, social scientists became interested in the idea that differences in family types – primarily the practiced rules of inheritance and the cohabitation of families under one roof – have long-lasting social, economic, and political effects. Here, we inquire into the relevance of family types for attitudes that facilitate market-based transactions and that are, hence, conducive to economic development. For our analysis, we make use of data on the prevalent family types in 135 regions in 12 Western European countries and compare them to attitudes in the population, as elicited by the European Social Survey. There are significant differences in people's conception of interpersonal relationships as well as their conception of the role of the state in society that can be linked to the prevalence of particular family types.

Keywords: family types; family systems; family structures; ideology; economic development.

JEL Codes: D10; H11; J12; K36; N30; O17; Z12.

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1. Introduction

The effects of historical events and culture on long-run economic development have become important areas of economic research (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017; Guiso et al. 2016; Tabellini 2010). In this article, we inquire into the relevance of very fundamental cultural traits related to the organization of the family. More specifically, we take up the conjecture pushed by some anthropologists (Goode 1963; Laslett 1965; Le Play 1895; Todd 1985) that different family types – also referred to as family structures or family systems – are an important determinant of many dimensions of human development, such as education, the onset of industrialization, and fertility rates. In a series of books, Emmanuel Todd (e.g., 1985; 1990; 2019) claims that family structures are not only extremely stable over time, but they also determine ideological convictions and thereby political and economic development. In the long run, the values and attitudes underlying these different ideologies would lead to differences in the strength of states, rule of law levels, the stability of government, and income inequality to name but a few of the effects to be expected. Some of these claims have recently been studied empirically by economists (see, e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2014; Gutmann and Voigt 2020c).

In previous research, we have analyzed the relationship between family types and ideological convictions, state formation, constitutional structure, and post-constitutional outcomes empirically (Gutmann and Voigt 2020a). We did so by comparing political development and dominant family types in 135 countries. This approach relies on a disputable assumption that is common in this literature: Although we know that there is significant within-country heterogeneity in family types, countries are generally coded as characterized by a single family type. Moreover, following Todd (1985), the study relates dominant family types directly to institutional traits, such as the rule of law, thus disregarding the transmission channels by which family types would translate into specific institutional traits.

In this contribution, we study the relationship between family types and a number of attitudes that we consider essential to achieving economic prosperity. Instead of studying country-level outcomes, we rely on up to 135 regions located in 12 Western European countries. This design enables us to add value beyond the existing studies: by studying regional units, we can focus on within-country variation. Differences between countries, which could also be caused by other institutional differences, can be discarded in such a research design via the use of country fixed effects. Moreover, most European countries in our data are

characterized by different family types in different regions. France, for example, is divided into 22 regions and is host to various family types. Moreover, by studying differences in values and attitudes that follow directly from the experience of socialization under a particular family type, we are not leaving out any unspecified transmission channels that could link family types to our outcomes of interest.

This is the first study inquiring into family types as a potential determinant of values and attitudes that are generally assumed to be conducive to the development of economy and state. Overall, family types are found to be an important factor determining individuals' values and attitudes. Survey respondents living in areas in which a family type dominates that emphasizes the importance of equality are significantly more supportive of statements of the importance to do what one is told to do and to follow the rules. These respondents also agree with statements endorsing cultural homogeneity as well as a strong state. Survey respondents living in areas in which family types dominate that emphasize the importance of liberty display a lower valuation of helping and caring for others. They are also concerned about inequality and less likely to endorse redistributive policies. In contrast to those from areas with egalitarian family organization, they do not believe that it is important to have a strong state.

The rest of the article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe the two central dimensions of which family types are comprised and we introduce a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between family types and people's attitudes. Section 3 contains a brief summary of studies that have analyzed the effects of family types empirically. Our data are described in Section 4 and Section 5 contains the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with a number of suggestions for future research.

2. Theory

2.1. The Basic Argument

Cultural economics has firmly established that there is a systematic relationship between culture and various (economic) outcomes. Alesina and Giuliano (2014), in particular, have studied the role of family ties for individual attitudes and decisions as well as for aggregate political and economic outcomes. Here we are taking a broader view at how the organization of households in line with different family

types affects attitudes that are potentially relevant to economic prosperity. Our theory is inspired by and builds on the work of Emmanuel Todd (1985; 1990; 2019).

Todd (1985) bases his typology of family systems on two core values of the French revolution, namely *liberté* and *egalité*. Drawing on Le Play (1895), he argues that the level of liberty that members of society enjoy is determined by the relationship between fathers and their sons, whereas the level of equality is determined by inheritance rules. If sons live under one roof with their parents, even after having married, their liberty is expected to be curtailed. Whereas if they had their own household, sons could enjoy considerably more freedom. Regarding inheritance, Todd argues that if all children receive the same proportion of the father's wealth, this fosters equality. If, in contrast, rules prevail that envision an unequal distribution, for example because of the impartiality of the estate, this may facilitate inequality. Combining these two dimensions leads to four different family types (as depicted in Table 1).[2]

Table 1: Schematic representation of family types

		Liberty	
		Low: married son stays with parents	High: married son moves out
Equality	Low: unequal treatment of brothers	Authoritarian type (e.g., Auvergne, France)	Absolute nuclear family type (e.g., Bretagne, France)
	High: equal treatment of brothers	Community type (e.g., Toscana, Italy)	Egalitarian nuclear family type (e.g., Normandy, France)

Now, Todd's (1985) main conjecture is that family structures are very stable over time and, furthermore, that they constitute models for the design of political systems: The relationship between state authority and individual in a country should accordingly reflect the relationship between father and son within the country's families. Rather than specifying a concrete causal mechanism, which is responsible for the mirroring of family types on the societal level, Todd (1985, 6) simply refers

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[2] Todd adds a third dimension to this classification, asking whether consanguineous marriages are socially accepted or even desired. According to Todd, an entire belt of countries ranging from Pakistan in the East to Morocco in the West is characterized by this, but since we are only studying countries in Western Europe, endogamy is irrelevant here.

to important thinkers like Aristotle, Confucius or Rousseau having made similar arguments.

Throughout his writings, Todd has argued that family types are even more stable over time than religious beliefs. In Todd (1990, 137ff.), he argues that the spread of different types of Protestantism can be explained by the prevalence of certain family types. The authoritarian family type in combination with favorable conditions, such as a high literacy rate or a large distance to Rome, led to the diffusion of orthodox Lutheranism, whereas combining these favorable conditions with the absolute nuclear family led to what Todd calls "Arminian" Protestantism,[3] which spread in the Netherlands and in England. The egalitarian nuclear family combined with favorable conditions for challenging the authority of priesthood allowed the continuation of Catholicism, whereas the egalitarian nuclear family combined with non-favorable conditions allows the continuation of a more ancient form of Catholicism.

Generally speaking, Todd interprets the centuries following 1648 as centuries of secularization, which enabled the rise of some ideologies. The ideologies that became major forces in different regions of the world were reflective of the prevalent family types in these regions.[4] Todd argues that religion co-evolves with family structures, but at twice the speed of change of family structures. For most purposes, family structures can accordingly be considered exogenous.[5]

Here, we are interested in the relevance of family types for economic development. In "*The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*", Max Weber (1905/1958) argued that a number of attitudes, in particular secondary virtues, were instrumental

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[3] Named after the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius. Todd attributes weak authority of both God and the priests to Arminian Protestantism (as opposed to the strong authority of God attributed to Lutheranism).

[4] More recently, Todd (2019) distinguishes between aspects of human development that differ regarding their stability over time: economic development takes 50 years, progress regarding education 500 years, but the evolution of family structures took 5000 years. This schematic is reminiscent of Williamson's (2000) four levels of social analysis.

[5] Not all anthropologists share this view. Goody (2000, 27), e.g., argues that Christianity changed the European family. He explains the behavior of Church leaders with their interest in inheriting as much property as possible and argues that not only the prohibition of endogamy was conducive to that aim, but also the Church's repudiation of adoption and making remarriage difficult. According to Goody (2000, 36), the church acquired rights to more than one-third of all arable land in the French region of Gaul between the fifth and the eighth century.

in the development of some societies. Although some scholars have criticized the validity of his theory, many others still draw inspiration for their own work from Weber (e.g., Landes 1998). Inspired by Weber, we argue that some beliefs and attitudes are more conducive to a prosperous economy than others. Voigt (1993) contains a list of such beliefs. In the following subsections, we ask whether different family types are likely to bring about such beliefs. We start with the conception of the self (2.2), then we move on to conceptions of interpersonal relationships (2.3), followed by conceptions regarding the role of the state in society (2.4).

2.2. The Conception of the Self

The nuclear family types, no matter whether absolute or egalitarian, are conjectured to be conducive to individualism. Grown up children are not expected to share a household with their parents, which gives them more liberty than under the other family types.

Therefore, we expect attitudes emphasizing the freedom to decide individually how to live one's life to be more prevalent in regions dominated by a nuclear family type. Closely related are attitudes emphasizing that it is important to make one's own decisions. We expect such attitude to be less prevalent if children, at least traditionally, kept on living under one roof with their parents after getting married.

Individualism and individualist attitudes have long been argued to be conducive to economic development (see, e.g., Voigt 1993; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017). If many people are convinced that individual effort is irrelevant for their achievements and that fate or God or one's ancestors determine their success, it is hard to picture a prosperous economy with many entrepreneurs and high rates of economic growth.

Innovation is essential for dynamic efficiency and, hence, an important precondition for the development of economies. We expect households being comprised of three (or more) generations to be detrimental to innovative thinking and individuals' attitude towards innovation. If married children remain under the tutelage of their parents, the parents are likely to influence many important decisions. This has consequences for both the importance attributed to having new ideas, as well as the importance of trying new and different things, i.e. to act upon new ideas.

2.3. The Conception of Interpersonal Relationships

Family types do not only impact how people conceive of themselves, but also their relationships with others. One can expect that the inegalitarian family types are conducive to attitudes in favor of accepting hierarchies and not questioning the authority of superiors.

Ex ante, the consequences of accepting hierarchies and authority for economic development are unclear: On the one hand, innovative rule breakers have been hailed by economists, such as Schumpeter and Hayek, as being key to economic development. On the other hand, acceptance of authority has been described by others as a precondition for producing a stable social order.[6]

Todd (1985:120) argues that individualism implies tolerance towards others. Formulated as a hypothesis: *Regions dominated by nuclear family types display more tolerance than other societies.* Tolerance is often argued to promote economic development (Berggren and Elinder 2012a, 2012b). Trade is facilitated if the quality of the good is key – and not the religion or the ethnicity of the trader.

Interpersonal trust has been shown to be conducive to economic development (Arrow 1972). This is why we are asking here whether some family types are conducive to generalized trust. Given that differences in trust levels have not only been shown to be amazingly stable over time but that they also have important effects on the way legal institutions are implemented (Gutmann and Voigt 2020b) as well as on economic development, we are interest in the link between family types and trust.

Regions dominated by unequal inheritance rules are likely characterized by more mobility, as younger siblings will not inherit the family business. Contact theory posits that the resulting increased personal contact with others should promote interpersonal trust.

A strong civil society has been shown to be conducive to good governance (e.g., Putnam 1993 or La Porta et al. 1997) as well as to economic development (Keefer and Knack 1997). Todd (1985, 103) observes that countries in which nuclear family systems dominate are characterized less by totalitarian ideologies or political forms

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[6] De Waal (1996, 92), for example, claims that "without agreement on rank and a certain authority, there can be no great sensitivity to social rules, as anyone who has tried to teach simple house rules to a cat will agree".

that try to eliminate civil society. Therefore, we expect that regions dominated by nuclear family types realize a more vivid civil society.

2.4. The Conception of the Role of the State

If brothers are not considered equal and family structures are mirrored in the constitutional structure of a country, then individuals in these societies cannot be expected to attribute much importance to the equal treatment of people.[7] Under these systems, "all men are not considered equal" and individuals would not expect the state to do so (Todd 1985:55).

Individualism can also impact how much power one is ready to delegate to the state. Regions dominated by a nuclear family type should be attributing less importance to having a strong government that can ensure safety. At the same time, they should also have less trust in government institutions, such as parliaments or the legal system.

Regarding income inequality, Todd (1985) claims that countries in which the authoritarian family structure dominates teach people to accept inequality in interpersonal relations. Todd (1990, 455) further observes that the absolute nuclear family type does not imply the acceptance of inequality, it would simply imply indifference vis-à-vis inequality. He expects family types that allow for unequal inheritance practice to be opposed to redistribution. People brought up in regions where an egalitarian family type dominates are more likely to endorse redistribution by the government.

3. Brief Survey of Empirical Research

Only in recent years have economists become interested in culture and, more specifically, in family organization, which explains why most empirical studies of family types are of recent vintage. There are studies using countries as their unit of analysis and others that operate on the subnational level. Moreover, many potential effects of family types have been analyzed. Here, we start with the contributions

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[7] If Todd's argument is correct, they might not even try to implement the rule of law as their ideological convictions entail skepticism of it.

that analyze the effects of family types on the nation state level before we turn to those making comparisons on the regional level.

Dilli (2016) asks whether family systems can explain differences in democracy levels across countries and finds that those characterized by a nuclear family structure are more democratic. In their analysis of the timing of the introduction and the generosity of state-run pension systems vis-à-vis pensioners, Galasso and Profeta (2018) show that inheritance rules are an important explanatory factor, as countries with egalitarian inheritance rules tend towards more generous pension systems. Galasso and Profeta also consider the liberty-dimension of family structures and find that it cannot explain differences in pension systems across countries.

Like Galasso and Profeta (2018), Ellul et al. (2010) study inheritance rules and find that stricter rules (limiting the freedom of the testator to choose how much wealth to allocate to each heir) are associated with less investment into family firms, which is definitely of high relevance for economic development. This already concludes our brief overview of studies comparing family structures on the country level.

Broms and Kokkonen (2019) study variation in family types on both the country level and the regional level. They ask whether inheritance regimes are a good predictor for differences in today's institutional quality. Their dependent variable – institutional quality – is a very broad one. Broms and Kokkonen argue that inheritance regimes favoring a single heir are conducive to the development of private property rights and trust, which, in turn, is conducive to high quality institutions. They find support for trust being a transmission channel from non-egalitarian inheritance rules to higher contemporaneous institutional quality.

De la Croix and Perrin (2018) try to explain changes in fertility levels and educational attainment in France over a number of centuries as a response to individual economic incentives. Since their initial empirical model leaves them with an unexplained residual, they turn to other potential explanations, such as language, religion, elite behavior, or family structures. De la Croix and Perrin find that considering family structures adds substantial explanatory power to their empirical model.

Bonoldi et al. (2020) are interested in whether primogeniture –a non-egalitarian inheritance rule – leads to higher voter turnout. They hypothesize that this should be the case, because under primogeniture property rights are more secure, which

incentivizes people to turn out at the voting booth to keep this high level of property rights protection. Bonoldi et al. find that in South Tyrol (a region in Northern Italy that is influenced by both an Italian and a Germanic tradition and, thus, by competing inheritance rules), villages with a rule similar to primogeniture display a comparatively higher voter turnout.

Finally, the study most similar to ours is Duranton et al. (2009). It was the first study to match the regions used by Todd to the NUTS regions in Western Europe. It was also the first comprehensive attempt to recognize family types as a determinant of important outcome variables, such as household size, educational attainment, social capital, labor force participation, sectoral structure (i.e., the share of the workforce employed in manufacturing), wealth, and income inequality. Duranton et al. observe a dividing line between regions characterized by the absolute nuclear family on the one hand, and those characterized by all other family types on the other. The former exhibit comparatively smaller household size, better education, higher employment rates, a more active civil society, a larger service sector, and a more dynamic economy. Whereas Duranton et al. (2009) looked into a number of "hard" outcome variables, we are focusing here on more proximate outcomes, as we will be analyzing the connections between family types and a number of values and attitudes that should be conducive to economic development.

4. Data

In order to empirically test our hypotheses, data on the prevalent family structures in a society are needed. In his 1990 book *L'Invention de l'Europe*, Todd draws on a total of 483 regions located in 17 Western European countries and he attributes one dominant family type to each of these regions. In addition to the four family types referred to in the previous sections, Todd also includes the incomplete authoritarian family as well as an undetermined residual category. The incomplete authoritarian family is characterized by the simultaneous existence of an authoritarian trait in structuring the household (only a single married child is allowed to stay with the parents) and inheritance officially following egalitarian principles. This type exists between the Latin and the Germanic regions of Europe (Todd 1990, 64f.). For the purpose of our hypothesis tests, we are treating the incomplete authoritarian family type as a special case of the authoritarian family type.

Duranton et al. (2009) convert the regions coded by Todd into the NUTS region classification used by the European Union. As the regions defined by Todd do not perfectly coincide with the NUTS areas, Duranton et al. do not code one predominant family type in a region, but they measure the share of a region's area in which a particular family type is dominant. Unlike Todd's original coding, the data by Duranton et al. is, thus, not binary, but a proportion scaled between 0 and 1. We match their regional data with individual-level survey data from the European Social Survey (up until version 1.2 of ESS9). This is no easy task, as the regional classification used by the ESS has changed over time and data is recorded on different levels of aggregation for different countries. Regions in Germany and the United Kingdom, for example, are only defined on the NUTS 1-level, whereas data from France and Italy can be disaggregated to the NUTS 2-level. In cases where the ESS regional classification is on a higher level of aggregation, we combine the family type coding of Duranton et al. (2009) by taking the mean value. Data for the German state of Baden-Württemberg (DE1) is, for example, derived by taking the mean value of the prevalence of family types in Stuttgart (DE11), Karlsruhe (DE12), Freiburg (DE13), and Tübingen (DE14). A country like Luxembourg does not provide information in our analysis, which employs country fixed effects, as Luxembourg consists of only of one NUTS-region. Also data on Denmark cannot be used, because Duranton et al. (2009) used a NUTS classification that is now outdated and cannot be matched with the current NUTS regions. Excluding Denmark and Luxembourg from our dataset leaves us with 179,462 survey respondents from 135 regions in 12 countries.

The prevalence of regional family types is very heterogeneous in our sample. Most common is the authoritarian family, which accounts for 45% of the respondents, followed by the two nuclear family types at around 13% each. Another 9% can be classified as incomplete authoritarian family type and less than 5% are of the community family type. Moreover, 53% of the sample are females and the average age of respondents is 49.

For our main empirical analysis, we recode the different family types into two indicators for the dimensions in family types relevant to testing our theoretical hypotheses. "Equality" is the sum of the prevalence of egalitarian nuclear and community family types in a region; and "liberty" is the overall prevalence of nuclear family types in a region. Results for the individual family types are shown in the Appendix.

5. Results

For our empirical analysis, we have recoded all dependent variables to range from zero to one to facilitate comparability of the results. The scales of some variables have been inverted such that higher values indicate more agreement with the value or attitude in question. The following tables show the results of linear regression models estimated by ordinary least squares. The unit of observation are the individual survey respondents. All models control for country fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered on the regional level. The exact meaning of each dependent variable is described in the notes below the tables.

Table 2 shows our results for the effect of family types on individuals' conception of the self. We find no statistically significant relationship between family types and any of our dependent variables. People's appreciation of individual liberty and innovative thinking are clearly not linked to the family types most prevalent in their region.

<<< Table 2 around here >>>

This is different for individuals' conception of interpersonal relationships. The results in Table 3 indicate that more egalitarian family types are associated with a higher willingness to follow rules and the orders of others, as well as with a higher appreciation of cultural homogeneity, which we interpret as leading to less tolerance. The liberty dimension is not linked to differences in these attitudes and neither dimension is relevant for the level of generalized trust in a region. Liberty in the family is associated with people having a lower valuation of help and care for the well-being of others. Equality in the family, although not statistically significant, shows the opposite sign. When it comes to actual behavior, people do not report statistically significant differences in people's helpfulness along the lines of family types, but the signs remain the same as for the attitude towards helping others.

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Table 4 shows how family types are linked to people's conception of the role of the state in society. Egalitarian family types are associated with more demand for a strong protective state and more trust in a country's parliament. More liberty in the

family is associated with less support for having a strong state, more trust in the country's legal system, and less support for government redistribution. The lower support for government redistribution is consistent with the fact that individuals in these regions also do not consider differences in living standards as too detrimental for the fairness of society. The question whether people should be treated equally and should have equal opportunities, however, does not find more or less support among particular family types.

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To sum up our findings: None of the family types, or the two dimensions liberty and equality, seem to be associated with differences in people's conception of the self, as operationalized in our empirical analysis. Equality in the family comes with a higher willingness to follow rules and orders and a stronger preference for cultural homogeneity. Individuals want a strong protective state and have trust in their elected representatives. Liberty in the family is associated with being less concerned about inequality and less supportive of government intervention to reduce inequality. Individuals consider help and care for others less important and are, consistent with that, also less interested in having a strong state. Liberty in the family, however, is not simply associated with a rejection of state institutions. As these individuals have high trust in a country's legal system, it is evident that their vision of the role of the state in society is one of a limited government under counter-majoritarian constraints.

Although they are not the focus of this study, our control variables also show some interesting patterns. Women, for example, attribute less value to free decision-making, while favoring rule compliance and a strong state. They are opposed to income inequality and support that the government reduces it. Older respondents also attribute less importance to free decision-making, but in most cases the effect of age on values and attitudes appears to be nonlinear.

6. Conclusion and Outlook

The relevance of institutions and culture for economic development has become a successful research area in recent years. In this contribution, we are adding to that literature by analyzing the role of family types for a number of values and attitudes that are assumed to be conducive to economic development. These values and

attitudes relate to individuals' conception of the self, their conception of interpersonal relationships, and their conception of the role of the state in society. For our analysis, we rely on survey data from the European Social Survey that covers around 170,000 individuals in 135 regions of 12 Western European countries. As we include country fixed effects, our research design is focused exclusively on the analysis of within-country variation. It turns out that the two central dimensions of family types - liberty in terms of cohabitation of different generations in one household and equality in terms of inheritance rules for siblings – are important predictors of attitudes relating to both interpersonal relationships as well as conceptions of the state.

Being aware of these differences is likely to be useful for policy makers. In countries with regions dominated by different family types, such as France, decentralized policy-making could help to better align policies with citizens' preferences.

Regarding the stability of family types over time, it might be interesting to rerun a study similar to the one presented here that focuses exclusively on first- or second-generation immigrants. If their home countries are dominated by family types different from the one dominant in their country of residence, we could learn something about the stability of family structures over time.

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Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

	N	mean	sd	min	max
DCLVLF	40,272	0.76	0.22	0.00	1.00
IMPFREE	172,402	0.77	0.22	0.00	1.00
IPCRTIC	172,149	0.69	0.24	0.00	1.00
IMPDIFF	172,348	0.60	0.27	0.00	1.00
IPFRULE	171,599	0.55	0.28	0.00	1.00
PPLSTRD	41,633	0.45	0.28	0.00	1.00
PPLTSTRD	179,043	0.53	0.23	0.00	1.00
IPHLPPL	172,526	0.77	0.19	0.00	1.00
PPLAHLP	39,460	0.61	0.26	0.00	1.00
SMDFSLV	40,077	0.66	0.24	0.00	1.00
PPLHLP	178,800	0.52	0.22	0.00	1.00
IQEQOPT	172,377	0.79	0.20	0.00	1.00
IPSTRGV	170,680	0.71	0.24	0.00	1.00
TRSTPRL	175,025	0.47	0.25	0.00	1.00
TRSTLGL	176,031	0.55	0.25	0.00	1.00
GINCDIF	176,252	0.71	0.25	0.00	1.00
Equality	179,462	0.18	0.31	0	1
Liberty	179,462	0.26	0.39	0	1
Female	179,462	0.53	0.50	0	1
Age	178,865	48.93	18.65	14	123

Table A2: Conception of the Self

	(1) DCLVLF	(2) IMPFREE	(3) IPCRTIV	(4) IMPDIFF
Absolute nuclear	-0.002	0.000	0.007	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Egalitarian nuclear	0.007	0.010	0.007	0.012
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Incomplete authoritarian	0.001	-0.006	-0.004	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Communitarian	-0.044	-0.014	0.016	0.001
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Undetermined	-0.020*	-0.015**	-0.013*	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Female	-0.009*	-0.004	-0.018***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age	-0.001	-0.001***	0.002***	-0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	0.000*	0.000*	-0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	134	135	135	135
N	40,170	171,882	171,636	171,832
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.06

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, DCLVLF: 'Free to decide how to live my life', IMPFREE: 'Important to make own decisions and be free', IPCRTIV: 'Important to think new ideas and being creative', IMPDIFF: 'Important to try new and different things in life', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.

Table A3: Conception of Interpersonal Relationships

	(1) IPFRULE	(2) PPLSTRD	(3) PPLTRST	(4) IPHLPPL	(5) PPLAHLP	(6) PPLHLP
Absolute nuclear	-0.016	0.003	0.008	-0.009***	-0.016	0.000
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Egalitarian	0.033*	-0.029*	0.002	0.005	-0.011	0.016
nuclear	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Incomplete	-0.001	-0.001	0.007	-0.004	-0.005	0.007
authoritarian	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Communitarian	0.030	-0.057**	0.043*	-0.022	0.040	0.039*
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.029)	(0.016)
Undetermined	0.017	-0.021	-0.024**	0.008	-0.020	-0.011
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Female	-0.016***	0.026***	-0.011***	0.048***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	0.002***	0.000	0.002***	0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	0.000*	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	135	134	135	135	134	135
N	171,092	41,507	178,455	172,004	39,363	178,218
R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.10

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, IPFRULE: 'Important to do what is told and follow rules', PPLSTRD: '[Not] better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions', PPLTRST: 'Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful', IPHLPPL: 'Important to help people and care for others well-being', PPLAHLP: 'Feel people in local area help one another', PPLHLP: 'Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.

Table A4: Conception of the Role of the State

	(1) IPEQOPT	(2) IPSTRGV	(3) TRSTPRL	(4) TRSTLGL	(5) SMDFSLV	(6) GINCDIF
Absolute nuclear	-0.005	-0.015**	0.011	0.014*	-0.014	-0.013
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Egalitarian	0.005	0.035***	0.039**	0.033**	-0.028***	-0.005
nuclear	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Incomplete	-0.001	-0.008	0.004	0.011	-0.022*	-0.006
authoritarian	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Communitarian	0.001	0.005	0.083**	0.046	-0.024	0.004
	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Undetermined	0.001	0.019	-0.046***	-0.052***	0.038***	0.076***
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Female	0.030***	0.011***	-0.020***	-0.014***	0.019***	0.034***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age	0.001**	-0.001*	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.000	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	135	135	135	135	135	135
N	171,861	170,176	174,463	175,471	39,923	175,701
R-squared	0.02	0.06	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.06

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, IPEQOPT: 'Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities', IPSTRGV: 'Important that government is strong and ensures safety', TRSTPRL: 'Trust in country's parliament', TRSTLGL: 'Trust in the legal system', SMDFSLV: 'For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small', GINCDIF: 'Government should reduce differences in income levels', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.

Tables

Table 2: Conception of the Self

	(1) DCLVLF	(2) IMPFREE	(3) IPCRTIV	(4) IMPDIFF
Equality	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.007
	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Liberty	0.005	0.003	0.007	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Female	-0.009*	-0.004	-0.018***	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age	-0.001	-0.001***	0.002***	-0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	0.000*	0.000	-0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	134	135	135	135
N	40,170	171,882	171,636	171,832
R-squared	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.06

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, DCLVLF: 'Free to decide how to live my life', IMPFREE: 'Important to make own decisions and be free', IPCRTIV: 'Important to think new ideas and being creative', IMPDIFF: 'Important to try new and different things in life', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.

Table 3: Conception of Interpersonal Relationships

	(1) IPFRULE	(2) PPLSTRD	(3) PPLTRST	(4) IPHLPPL	(5) PPLAHLP	(6) PPLHLP
Equality	0.046**	-0.035*	-0.001	0.011	0.011	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.011)
Liberty	-0.016	0.007	0.004	-0.007*	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.006)
Female	-0.016***	0.026***	-0.011***	0.048***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	-0.001***	0.002***	0.000	0.002***	0.000	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	0.000*	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	135	134	135	135	134	135
N	171,092	41,507	178,455	172,004	39,363	178,218
R-squared	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.10

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, IPFRULE: 'Important to do what is told and follow rules', PPLSTRD: '[Not] better for a country if almost everyone shares customs and traditions', PPLTRST: 'Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful', IPHLPPL: 'Important to help people and care for others well-being', PPLAHLP: 'Feel people in local area help one another', PPLHLP: 'Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.

Table 4: Conception of the Role of the State

	(1) IPEQOPT	(2) IPSTRGV	(3) TRSTPRL	(4) TRSTLGL	(5) SMDFSLV	(6) GINCDIF
Equality	0.009	0.046***	0.035*	0.021	-0.011	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Liberty	-0.004	-0.012*	0.009	0.015*	-0.015*	-0.018*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Female	0.030***	0.011***	-0.020***	-0.014***	0.019***	0.034***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age	0.001**	-0.001*	-0.003***	-0.002***	-0.000	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age-squared	-0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions	135	135	135	135	135	135
N	171,861	170,176	174,463	175,471	39,923	175,701
R-squared	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.07	0.06

Note: OLS estimates, country fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are clustered in regions, IPEQOPT: 'Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities', IPSTRGV: 'Important that government is strong and ensures safety', TRSTPRL: 'Trust in country's parliament', TRSTLGL: 'Trust in the legal system', SMDFSLV: 'For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small', GINCDIF: 'Government should reduce differences in income levels', *: 0.05, **: 0.01, ***: 0.001.